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... Young sciences, like young men, have their
time of v/onder, hope, imagination, and of
passion too, and haste, and bigotry. Dazzled,
and that pardonably, by the beauty of the fev/
laws they have discovered, they are too apt to
erect them into gods, and to explain by them
all matters in heaven and earth; and apt, too
... to patch them where they are weakest, by
that most dangerous succedaneum of vague and
grand epithets, which very often contain, each
of them, an assumption far more important than
the law to which they are tacked. ^
That this should have been written over a
century ago, in an essay on "limits" gives one pause.
This is also an essay on "limits," the same type of
limits to which Kingsley referred: those which define
a science that seeks to answer questions we normally
think of as non-scientific. Certainly a century has
been adequate to make these limits clear.
1
Charles Kingsley, The Limits of Exact Science
as Appl ied to History (London: fIacriTiTan~"3t Co.
,
lSGOT, P. 17. ~~~

2Or has it? The past hundred years has seen
many changes in the application of scientific method to
social theory. A revolution in data handling and data
reduction, as well as one in communications, has placed
most facts within the confident reach of the social
theorist. At the same time, and as scientific theories
abound, the critics of scientific method as applied to
politics have doubled and redoubled their efforts to
show the irrelevance of any theories that might result
from such an application. It must be admitted, then,
that the limits of science in social theory are not
known, or at least are imperfectly known.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the
limits of pure realism and empiricism in theories of
international relations, with the object of reaching
a decision as to whether it is, or will ever be,
possible to construct a science of politics. This v/ill
not be the first time the question of the possibility
of creating a science of politics has been engaged,
as Dr. Kingsley's essay shows. Undoubtedly, it will
not be the last, for those who have chosen sides in
the debate over science in politics are not likely
to give up their views easily.
One purpose which this thesis does not have
is to arbitrate the dispute between the realist and the
empiricist. There has been a dispute, as Hans Morgenthau's

very title Scientific Man vs Power Politics suggests.
It results, quite simply, from the fact that the realist
acknowledges finite limits to his understanding and the
empiricist does not - or at least does not seem to.
The two speak different languages: the realist tends
to become a moral philosopher and the empiricist one
form or other of manipulator. An accommodation between
these two theories is impossible.
The thesis here is that the theories of pure
realism, as expounded by Hans J. Morgenthau in his
principal work Politics among Nations
,
and empiricism,
as delineated by Morton A. Kaplan in his magnum opus
System and Process in International Politics, are equally
erroneous and erroneous for very similar reasons. These
reasons themselves lead the way to a discovery of their
limits as theories of international relations and to a
determination as to the practicability of ever attaining
a science of politics.
This thesis starts with a critical comparison
of the theories of international relations of Morton A.
Kaplan and Hans J. Morgenthau. A comparison between
Kaplan and Morgenthau which seeks similarities may
seem at first a very strange endeavor. After all,
Kaplan's theory is admittedly "a systematic effort to
cope with the many aspects of international politics
from an abstract, theoretical and semiformal point of

view." Of this type of effort, Professor Morgenthau
has remarked that:
... The retreat into the trivial, the formal,
the methodological, the purely theoretical, the
remotely historical - in short, the politically
irrelevant - is the unmistakable sign of a "non-
controversial" political science which has
neither friends nor enemies because it has no
relevance for the great political issues in
which society has a stake. 3
The juxtaposition of these two excerpts makes it appear
that Kaplan and Morgenthau should be archenemies as
theorists of international politics. Could it be that
they have anything in common?
It is the contention of this writer that
Kaplan and Morgenthau have a great deal in common;
that their theories spring from a common conceptual
root, that they use a similar methodology in their
approach to theory-building, and that their theories
end in substantially the same prescriptions for
resolution of world problems. The "u topi as" of both
become irrelevant for largely the same reasons. Therefore
first part of this thesis explores these similarities
in root, method and conclusions, respectively. The
likenesses are instructive not for their own sake,
2~
Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in Internationa l
Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., lWS'i)
,
p. xiii
3Hans J. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of_ Pol itics (Chicago:





but because they highlight the basic weakness of the
approach to theory-building which -they represent.
A critical comparison betv/een Kaplan and
Morgenthau is not the purpose of this thesis, however.
It can only lead the way to a full discussion of the
place and purpose of method in theory and to an answer
to the question of the possibility of a real "political
science." This discussion is contained in the second
part of this thesis. It concludes that a true political
science is indeed impossible, for reasons given therein
and elucidated in the three-chapter discussion of the
Kaplan and Morgenthau theories.
Before beginning the discussion in earnest,
two points should be made. First, any critic of
Hans J. Morgenthau, and this thesis contains many
criticisms of him, should give due credit to the great
mind that produced Poli tics among Nations. It is
strange that many otherwise serious students of inter-
national relations consider it almost a duty to criticize
Morgenthau. To be sure, the theory of pure realism
has many limitations. But it is, Kaplan f s theory not-
withstanding, the most internally consistent conceptual
framework produced to date. The student should understand
the basic flaw in Politics among Nations is not its
wholesale adherence to the theory of power politics
but its failure to grasp the significance of man '
s

ability to transform what Morgenthau himself calls the
"struggle for power" into a "struggle for peace." If
a reader of this thesis believes that politics is not a
struggle for power, he may disagree violently with my
conclusions, because, at root, my only complaint with
Morgenthau is that he neglected to tell fully the other
side of the tale.
Second, the reader will discover only slight
reference in this thesis to the phrase "conceptual
framework." The thesis does not attempt to construct
such a framework, although it will become obvious that
both Kaplan and Morgenthau have. Thus this thesis is
not predominantly constructive. It identifies the
weaknesses of pure realism and empiricism, and points
out pitfalls to be avoided in theory-building. Despite
a rather comprehensive treatment of methodology in
theory, it does not build a theory. Although it suggests
at least a frame of mind which is a prerequisite for
theory-building, it does not erect a framework or fill
it in. It concludes that the realist and the empiricist
both have tasks to perform in constructing a flexible
framework by which to understand politics. Let us see,
then, what the realist and the empiricist have to tell
us about politics and, by seeing how they approach




A CRITICAL COMPARISON OF KAPLAN AND MORGENTHAU
1. THE COMMON ROOTS OF PURE REALISM AND EMPIRICISM
The clearest way to arrive at an understanding
of the extent to which the theories of pure realism as
expounded by Hans Morgenthau, and empiricism as set out
by Morton Kaplan, are alike is to trace what has happened
to the so-called doctrine of the "natural harmony of
interests," which finds its roots in the eighteenth
century Enlightenment. Philosophers of that age were
deeply impressed by the harmony of nature which the begin-
nings of modern science seemed to reveal. Could not this
harmony also be found in the social structure, revealed
in the nature of man and his institutions? Certainly
these philosophers thought that it could. As soon as the
"artificial" strictures which had been placed on political,
economic and religious man by aristocratic governments,
mercantilism and the Church were removed, the nature of
man and his natural social institutions would be revealed.
Then, the natural goodness of man operating within these
institutions would assert itself. One might even say
that the entire purpose of the Enlightenment as an

8intellectual exercise was to explore the unfettered nature
of man and his "true" institutions. David Kume thought it
worthwile to try if the science of man will
not acini t of the same accuracy which several
parts of natural philosophy are found
susceptible of. There seems to be all the
reason in the world to imagine that it may be
carried to the greatest degree of exactness.
If, in examining several phenomena, we find
that they resolve themselves into one common
principle, and can trace this principle into
another, we shall at last arrive at those few
simple principles on which all the rest depend
.
The logical result of such a discovery, for Hume and for
his contemporaries, would be the assertion of human nature
into human dealings in such a way that a natural harmony
of individual interests would result. In short: Utopia.
Suffice it to say here that the doctrine of
natural harmony did not succeed. Man must act as well as
think. Nineteenth-century philosophers, failing to recog-
nize the essentially dialectic character of such concepts
as "freedom" and "justice," paved the way for nineteenth-
century actors, who knew their dialectic character but
felt constrained to act in spite of it, and pursued the
Enlightenment perspective to the catastrophe at Sarajevo.
Although the total inapplicability of the doctrine of
natural harmony to the real world should have been recog-
nized by 1918, the coming upon the world scene of the
United States, in the form of Utopian Wilsonianism, gave
David Hume, An Abstract of a Treatise of Human
Nature (Kamden, Conn: Arc hon BooHs" HHTSTT p." $T~

the doctrine a second hearing. It failed this hearing at
Geneva and at Munich. By 1939 the doctrine was , for oper-
2
ational purposes, a dead letter.
As a result of the operational demise of the
doctrine of natural harmony, the realist critique was born.
Best expressed by E. H. Carr , this critique told us that
natural harmony was a chimera; that it had never existed,
and doubtless never would. Carr's critique was elaborated
further by Hans J. Morgenthau, who replaced "natural
harmony" with the judgment that "the idea of interest is
indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the
3
circumstances of time and place." In short, the tradi-
tional values of the Enlightenment perspective having been
manifestly shown in error by the force of events, a concep-
tual revolution was needed to fill in the gap. The realist
critique could destroy, but it was unable on its own to
build a new structure out of the ashes which it had created
New theory was needed.
There was one area in which the Enlightenment
perspective - so it seemed - had not been called into
question either by the force of events or by the realist
critique. This was the area of science itself. Social
scientists saw that the political values of the eighteenth
^E. K. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London:
MacHillan 8s Co., rTtcf.7"T9~ST) Chapter~67~
^Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations




and nineteenth centuries had been decimated by the realist
critique, but "scientific truth" remained. The flaw of the
Enlightenment, it was alleged, was in the fact that values
had been postulated a priori, and political science had
developed around them. "Many of the most influential
political writings," observed Harold Lasswell and Abraham
Kaplan, "- those of Plato, Locke, Rousseau, the Federalist
,
and others - have not been concerned with political inquiry
at all, but with the justification of existent or proposed
political structures."" Had not the realist critique
proved that? Of course. T/as not, then, the solution to
be found in a separation of political inquiry from political
structures - of philosophy from science?
With the blatant disregard that only a non-
scientist can show for the real meaning of scientific
truth and the scientific method, the sociological tech-
nicians fell upon the task of creating a value -free theory
of social man. With complete ignorance of the extent to
which Einstein and Planck had called into question the very
roots of dependence on a classical scientific method, the
technocrats set out to construct a world-view based,
methodologically, on Newtonian concepts. Karl Mannheim
showed the way. In order to determine which way history
^Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and






is moving we must discover principia media that are
completely value-free. Any objection that one's view
of the past might be somewhat colored by one's view of the
present was brushed aside with the rejoinder that "no one
has as yet really understood the present from the past who
did not approach the past with the will to understand the
present." Faith in science, then - and an outmoded
concept of science at that - fulfilled for post-war social
scientists the same function that faith in natural harmony
had fulfilled for earlier philosophers and diplomats. In
each case, the conceptual revolution was to usher in a
millenium of peace.
Such are the intellectual underpinnings of the
relevant Utopia of Morton Kaplan. Moved by the devastation
which the realist critique had wreaked on the values and
concepts of the Enlightenment, Kaplan's scientific prede-
cessors cast out all values (at least values expressed as
such) and turned to description (political science) instead
of promotion (political philosophy) . The divorce of science
and philosophy was thus rendered complete. It remained only
for Kaplan to appear on the scene in 1957 with System and
Process to bring the separation of political science and
political philosophy to its logical conclusion. In his
5Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of_
Reconstruction (London: Kegan Paul, Trench", Trubner





chief work any vestiges of the philosophic elements of
political theory which may have remained after the likes
of Deutsch, Lasswell, and Snyder v/ere cast aside. "This
theory," asserts Kaplan on his first page, "may be viewed
as an initial or introductory theory of international
7politics." For Kaplan, political theory is necessarily
scientific; elements of political theory which deal with
values as values are non-scientif ic; therefore, by
definition excluded from ever becoming a part of that
theory.
The way in which the realist critique led both
to the normless empiricism of Llorton Kaplan and to the type
of political theory stressing the role of power as a
normative factor in itself (Morgenthau) will be discussed
in the next section. What is important to keep in mind
here is that the two have a common root: the realist
critique. Even though it might seem, therefore, that
llorgenthau T s ov/n critique of the scientific approach to
theory building should discount the possibility of a
common foundation for the two, it is clear that they have
started in the same conceptual spot: by rejecting completely
the values and concepts of eighteenth and nineteenth
century political thought. The scientist is then moved
to cast values aside completely; the pure realist to make
"real" values - such as the national interest - normative.
7 . •Kaplan, op. cit., p. xn.
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Actually, as will be shown later, the similarity of
scientist and pure realism extends further than their
common root. There's more of the realist power theory
in System and Process and more of empirical science in
Politics Among Nations than either author would care to
admit.
It may be objected at this point that rejection
of the assumption of rationality by Morgenthau precludes
any but an accidental correspondence between his theory
and that of a scientist. "Social problems," he avers
in disparaging the scientists, "become mere scientific
propositions which, like mathematical and physical
problems, can all be solved rationally and with finality,
o
once the right formula is discovered." Does not
Morgenthau's criticism of the latent utopianism of the
scientific approaches place him at odds with Morton
Kaplan? No, for two reasons.
First, although there is ambiguity here, it
seems that tlorgenthau's criticism of rationality is not
directed at the conceptual stage of theory-building, but
at the actual stage of value-implementation. In other
words, the irrationality of which SJorgenthau speaks is
that of political man - not man as a builder of theories.
Hans J. tlorgenthau, Scientific Haa vs. Power




If Morgenthau thought that his own efforts at theory-
building, exemplified in Politics Among Nations
,
were
irrational, he would doubtless have left them unv/ritten.
Therefore, the irrationality of the scientific approach
for Morgenthau is not the fact that "formulas" are sought,
but the fact that scientists think that social problems
v/ill be capable of solution "once the right formulas are
discovered." The fault is not the quest for answers, but
that formulas suggested by scientists are not useful. In
this belief, Morgenthau is very closely allied with Kaplan,
who also suggests utility as the chief - if not the only -
reason for his attempt at a theory of international
9
relations.
The second reason that Morgenthau 's criticism
of scientific efforts at theory-building does not apply
to Kaplan on grounds of rationality is the peculiar nature
of Kaplan's theory itself. Criticism of the latent
utopianisra of an assumption of rationality is valid when
it is applied to scientific theories which take one aspect
of politics, such as communications in the case of Karl
Deutsch, decision-making in the case of Snyder, or elite-
analysis in the case of Lasswell, and attempt to view the
entire world political spectrum in terms of that one aspect
This criticism is not fairly applied, however, to Morton
Kaplan. The sweeping nature of the generalizations offered
9Kaplan, op. cit., p. xn.
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in System and Process is surpassed only by that offered in
Morgenthau's own writings. In his book, Kaplan has attempted
to survey the entire political spectrum capable of being
explored by behavioral and other sciences. Insofar as it
is possible for a scientist to be a world-view thinker,
Kaplan fulfills the role. There is no latent utopianism
in a work such as that of Kaplan which merely attempts to
set forth - in the broadest possible terns - what is.
There is only the monstrous danger of static bias and
worship of the status quo which may result from premature
closure of a conceptual gap thrown wide open by the realist
critique. It is into this trap that both Kaplan and
Morgenthau have fallen - together.

16
2. THE COMMON METHODS OF PURE REALISM AND EMPIRICISM
It was mentioned in the previous chapter that the
realist critique has led to both the normless empiricism of
Kaplan and the pure power theory of Hans J. Horgenthau.
The purpose of this section is to explain how pure realism
and empiricism utilise similar methods in reaching conclu-
sions. It should first be stated, hov/ever, that there is no
particular reason why the realist critique should lead to
either the results exemplified by System and Process or
Politics Among nations . It should lead, perhaps, to a
deeper understanding of the nature of the values which the
Enlightenment sought to implement, particularly to stress
the dialectic character of such concepts as freedom and
justice, by insisting that modifiers be attached to them.
There is no necessary connection between the realist
critique and the adoption of either a method which insists
that theory should be value -free, or one which relegates
that theory to the lowest conceivable level of human
interaction. If the beginning of understanding in
international relations is an appreciation of the realist
critique, a necessary second step is an ability on the part
of the theorist to transcend that critique in order to
extract what is good from the Enlightenment and cast aside
what is not good . Hoffmann is quite correct when he asserts

17
that pure realism is a counsel of despair and empiricism a
counsel of both laziness and despair. He might also have
added that pure realism - considered from the scholar's
point of view - is also a counsel of laziness, in that it,
like empiricism, seeks a simple solution to an extremely
complicated problem.
The effect of the realist critique on the methods
of Kaplan and Llorgenthau would seem, at first glance, to be
divisive. The latter, desiring to invert the Enlightenment,
seeks a return to the prerationalist era. From the former
we get the impression that any new theory is good theory.
What similarity can there be here? The contention would
seem to be that there is more of an attempt at scientific
methodology in Llorgenthau T s realism and more of the pre-
rationalist methodologist in Morton Kaplan than is
generally recognized. Do they meet, as regards method?
First, with regard to the extent to which
Morgenthau is a scientist, one must examine the way
Morgenthau approaches his subject. Experimental data to
test scientific propositions cannot be gained in a
laboratory, therefore, the scientist must turn to history
^Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in






^Although attempts have been made along these lines
by Harold Guetzkow of Northwestern University. See
Guetzkow, Simulation in Internat ional Relations





for evidence. The reader familiar with the realist school
of thought cannot fail to be impressed v/ith the fact that
Morgenthau differs from other realists in his conception
of history. Carr goes to great lengths to warn his readers
of the extent to which history is contingent on one's view
12
of the present, and Niebuhr states that "there are no
simple recurrences in history and therefore no analogies
between sequences in various periods of history which
could compel us to accept a proposition that a given policy
in a certain period will have similar effects as a social
13policy in another period." *" In contradistinction to this,
we find Morgenthau telling us that:
... if life in society were completely
contingent and irregular; only religion and
philosophy would be able to give meaning to
the historic past. This is, indeed, the
opinion of those who find that whatever
meaning and order there is in history is
only the reflection of the historian's
own mind . Yet even to the contemporaneous
observer , the contingencies of the present





luTribsr of typical pattern's".T4~
TEmphasis suppliedTJ"
The reason that Morgenthau differs from other
realists in his conception of history is that he desires
1 E. H. Garr , What is History ? (London: MacMillan
& Co. , Ltd.
,
1961) .
13Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political




14Horgenthau , Scientific Man, pp. 149-150.
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to make generalizations regarding the nature of inter-
national politics which will be universally applicable
,
and feels it necessary to use historical examples to support
these generalizations. Thus, v/e find "whatever the ultimate
aims of international politics, power is always the immediate
aim" supported by "the Crusaders wanted to free the holy
places from domination by the Infidels, Woodrow Y/ilson
15
v/anted to make the world safe for democracy," *" etc., etc.
To this extent, certainly, Morgenthau can be classified as
a "scientist."
It should be pointed out here that any theory
of international relations must draw the preponderance of
its evidence from history, and that generalizations con-
cerning the nature and direction of international politics
may be induced from this evidence. The writer does not
dispute these facts. The danger of such an enterprise
must, however, be taken into account. It is that an
assumption may be made, and all "facts" of history handled
in such a v/ay that the assumption will be verified. This
is the fallacy of premature closure. It is not truly
inductive; hypotheses such as the animus dominandi tend
to become self -generating conclusions. Morgenthau should
have heeded the words of the "prerationalist" philosopher




Explanation is of two kinds. One goes to the
root of the matter, as in natural science when
a sufficient proof is advanced to show that
the velocity of astronomical notion is constant.
The other is less radical, but lays down a
hypothesis and shows that the observed effects
are in accord with the supposition, as when
astronomy employs a system of eccentrics and
epicycles to justify our observations about
the notions of heavenly bodies. It does not
carry complete conviction because another
hypothesis might also serve. 16
If Morgenthau had heeded these words, he might have
realized that the drive for power, around which his theory
is built, "does not carry complete conviction" despite its
objective truth. "Another hypothesis," such as a drive
for community, or both a drive for power and a drive for
community, "might also serve." By closing his system
around the concept of the animus dominandi in order to
build - like any scientist - an internally consistent,
complete theory, Morgenthau paved the methodological v/ay
for the spate of empiricists who followed him, and whom
he now disparages.
The way in which Uorgenthau's methodology is
related to that of Kaplan is now probably becoming clear
to the reader, but the similarity v^ill not be fully evident
until the extent to which Kaplan is a pre-rational method-
ologist is discussed. Kaplan seeks to develop a scientific
politics by treating the materials of politics in terms of
system of action. A system of action is defined as a "set
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theolo?ica (Chicago:





of variables so related, in contradistinction to its
environment, that describable behavioral regularities
characterize the internal relationships of the variables
to each other and the external relationships of the set
of individual variables to combinations of external
17
variables." Kaplan carries the concept of system to
the field of international politics by describing six
possible types of international systems and the processes
which occur within these systems. He thus organizes his
theory around the two concepts which his title suggests:
system and process.
\7hether Kaplan's theory is open or closed may
best be determined by new evidence which does not at first
fit in. Let us test one of his rules with new evidence.
Kaplan avers that "in a loose bipolar system, the leading
member of a bloc, if it is of the directive, subsystem-
dominant type, will identify bloc and national interests." "
Assume for the moment that the Soviet Union decided to annex
Greenland, but did not attempt to enlist bloc support for
this move. If this ware to happen, Kaplan might qualify
his hypothesis with the addition: "except when the interests
of non-leading members of its bloc are involved in a policy
move to such a small degree that enlistment of their support
by the leading member would not prove worth the effort."
1 nA








Perhaps instead he would describe the behavior of the
Soviet Union as a "step-level function," which denotes
a change in the characteristic behavior of an actor. If
he adopted the first course, his method would appear to
be static, in that changes to his hypotheses would not be
handled in accordance with new "facts," but in accordance
with the preconceived conceptual framework.
Adoption of the second course would seem at
first to be another matter. "Step-level function" implies
a dynamic character in Kaplan's theory which keeps it open.
Indeed it would be an open system, were it not for the fact
that classification of an "input" or "output" as step-level
function or not is an entirely subjective matter, and that
"characteristic behavior" described by Kaplan in 1957 is
supposed to hold true for all political systems and pro-
cesses for all time. Y/hat looks at first like a dynamic
theory, then, turns out to be one capable of revision
within, but completely incapable of being structurally
revised by evidence which threatens the principal propo-
sitions (those setting up the six types of international
systems and the regulatory-integrative and disintegrative
processes) themselves. It is dynamic within, but static
without: another closed system.
Let me illustrate this point with a somewhat
homely example. Assume that a class were asked one multiple
choice question such as the following:
a. Tooth paste tastes good.
b. Tooth paste tastes bad.
c. Tooth paste doesn't taste at all.

23
Anyone answering this question would be tacitly granting
the assumptions on which the question is based: first,
that there is quality-taste; second, that there is a
substance - tooth paste; third, and most important, that
it is relevant to make a judgment concerning the quality
of taste to the substance called tooth paste at this time.
It would be inane to ask the question to the ancient Romans
they never had tooth paste. Likewise, an invention in the
future might render tooth paste obsolete. To link this
example to Morton Kaplan and make my analogy complete:
at about the time it became completely irrelevant to answer
my question about tooth paste, systems theorists would be
coming out with detailed propositions like: "21% fewer
cavities with Crest," and "Pepsodent whitens your teeth
and brightens your smile." The retreat into abstract
formalism makes the systems analyst say more and more about
less and less.
The net methodological result of such an enter-
prise has been best described by Barrington Moore as "the
19
new scholasticism" in social theory. In other words the
systems theorist, by enunciating propositions in a
"systematic" manner, and by allowing changes to his subject-
politics - to be introduced only insofar as they fit the
preconceived methodological framework, has committed the
same error of forcing its field to withdraw more and more
19Barrington Moore, Jr., Political Power and Social





from reality as the scholastic philosophers of old - and
modern - days. If this charge is applicable to Morton
Of)
Kaplan - and Moore certainly feels that it is - it
requires no stretch of the imagination to see that Kaplan
has answered Morgenthau T s own call for a return to the
prerationalist tradition, although certainly not in the
way I.Iorgenthau would have wanted!
The closure of theory of international relations
around the first and second image of the animus dominandi
21in the case of Morgenthau, and the second and third images
of system and process in the case of Kaplan, then, has
resulted from the pursuit of a similar method: one which
postulates a hypothesis in the abstract, then examines all
evidence in such a way that the hypothesis will be proved
and supported. Their theories end conceptually in the sum
total of international politics to one who agrees with them,
and a relatively worthless intellectual exercise to one who
does not. Since both Kaplan and tlorgenthau obviously
believe in their ovn theories, it should come as no surprise
that the results which issue from their similar approaches






Kenneth Waltz, Man , the State and War (New York
Columbia University Press, 195'9) .
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3. THE COMMON CONCLUSIONS
OF
PURE REALISM AND EMPIRICISM
Thus far it has been shown that pure realism and
empiricism have a common conceptual root and use similar
methods in their approaches to theory-building. It is the
purpose of this chapter to elaborate on the similar conclu-
sions reached by the approaches of pure realism and empiri-
cism. Here again, as in previous chapters, Kaplan and
Morgenthau "speak" for their respective schools.
It is axiomatic in the field of international
relations that conclusions reached by theorists must avoid
two dangers. The first is that of unduly argumentative
prescriptions on which the great number of theorists are
unable to agree. Most political theorists have come to the
view that political theory must be more than a procession
of polemics. There should be some sort of a "mainstream"
of opinion on political matters from which scholars may
branch out to form their particular ideas on particular
issues.
The other danger to conclusions in political
theory is that in reaching for this "mainstream," theorists
may resolve their differences only by agreement on some
sort of a "lowest-common denominator" which is almost
universal in teru.3 of its ability to produce agreement,
but almost completely irrelevant in terms of its ability

26
to be applied to political action.
Political theory must avoid these twin pitfalls.
Undoubtedly, the number of theories should be less than
the number of theorists, but we must avoid purchasing-
agreement at the price of relevance . If there is to be
a "common fund of propositions," it must be above the
lowest -common-denominator level. It was understanding of
this which led Karl Mannheim to call for the elaboration
°^ principia media (freely - middle range principles) in
22
social theory. "
To date, Mannheim's call for agreement on
principles above the lowest -common-denominator level has
not been answered. The next section will discuss the
question of whether or not such agreement is ever practi-
cable. Suffice it to say here that such agreement has not
been reached. Accordingly, we find political theory
drifting toward the two poles of excess subjectivism and
egregious irrelevance. It is the contention of this thesis
that as scientific theories, pure realism and empiricism
tend toward the latter pole. We can agree on the presence
of political "systems;" we can agree that men and states
possess - or are possessed by - a drive for power. The
point is that despite the insight we might gain by learning
these facts, they do not, standing alone, teach us a great
deal about politics.





The concept which is utilized by both systems
theory and power theory to produce agreement is a very old
one in politics. It is the notion of equilibrium. Indi-
viduals and nation-states must act (Morgenthau tells us)
and do act (Kaplan assures us) in such a way that an
international equilibrium is induced.
The source of the compelling power of the concept
of equilibrium to produce agreement among political
scientists is the undisputed fact that international
politics is conducted among nation-states. A system,
Kaplan tells us, is composed of active elements. These
elements settle in some sort of balance. This balance is
an equilibrium - a balance betv/een some nation-states on
one side and some on the other. Morgenthau reaches exactly
the same conclusion. The "struggle for power" can be allayed
and the "struggle for peace" won only on the precondition
that a balance of power between competing interests is
achieved. It is all true. Any theorist who has passed
through the realist critique with any understanding what-
soever will agree that in any but a one-power world, a
"balance of power" - or an "equilibrium of active elements"
(take your pick: they mean the same thing) - is a precon-
dition for stable world order. Those theorists who doubt
it after two world wars and twenty-two years of cold war




The point is that the concept of equilibrium is
totally irrelevant without a modifier alluding to the type
of equilibrium that is desirable. Here again, the field
of theory becomes divided, polemical, and in no essential
agreement. Some critics of Ilorgenthau point to an apparent
contradiction between what he says in Politics among nations
and what he recommends in his essays. This writer would not
be so inclined to label the alleged inconsistency a con-
tradiction as to stipulate that Ilorgenthau has engaged in
a "lyric leap" between his correct judgment that an equi-
librium is necessary and his understanding of the form it
should take and the policies best suited to result in any
particular kind of equilibrium. One can find himself in
substantial agreement with Politics among Nations and
disagree completely with Ilorgenthau on specific issues.
The conceptual flaw is the irrelevance of the concept of
equilibrium standing alone.
The v/ay in which Ilorgenthau reaches the necessity
for equilibrium is very simple: since interest is of the
essence of politics and since it is, as anyone knows
,
important to create a safe world, this world must be
created by achieving a balance between competing interests
(i.e. a balance of power). Furthermore, he says, "the
balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation
are not only inevitable but are an essential stabilizing
23factor in a society of sovereign nations.""' By "inevitable*
23
Ilorgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 167.
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in this context, Morgenthau means that states must choose
policies based on the balance -of -power principle, since
that principle is the only conceivable foundation for a
safe world. The balance of power, then, flows naturally
from the animus dominandi as a necessary condition for a
safe world.
Kaplan also reaches the conclusion of equilibrium
from extension of his central concept: that of system. By
analogizing the "system" concept from such organisms as
the human body and such mechanisms as a thermostat to
political sys terns , he reaches the conclusion that political
systems tend toward a sort of equilibrium; stable, unstable,
or "ultra-stable" (searching for a new level of stability)
.
Although the central concepts of f.Iorgenthau and
Kaplan are different, both theorists arrive at the "goal"
of equilibrium by essentially the same route: by postu-
lating that an equilibrium (or, in extreme cases, an
imperial domination by one power) is the best that one can
hope for as a solution to world political problems. To
be sure, equilibrium as a terminus follows logically from
extension of both the exclusive concept of the drive for
power and that of system. If all politics is power; if
all political action is seen as an expression of the animus
dominandi , then the best one can hope for is a tenuous,
ever -shifting balance -of -power - a situation of equilibrium.
24
"'Kaplan, System and Process, p. 7
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If all political action is "systemic;" if international
actors are at all times viewed as behaving in a system-
oriented fashion, then we can never free ourselves from
the necessity for an equilibrium within the international
"system" itself - no matter which of Kaplan's six systems
is the best description of world politics at any given time
This writer does not contest the necessity for
equilibrium either in the "power" sense or in the "system"
sense. Between now and the arrival of the millennium (and
it certainly appears that the millennium is not around the
corner) a balance -of -power will be a necessary precondition
of the resolution of the "struggle for power" and for
victory in the "struggle for peace . " This is simply hard
fact which history since 1914 has drummed into our heads.
What is contested here is the underlying assumption made
by empiricists (and here it is understood that Morgenthau
as well as Kaplan is an "empiricist") that the production
of this balance -of -power - this system in equilibrium - is




Moreover, promotion of the notion of equilibrium
from the status of "necessary" to the status of "necessary
and sufficient," is both conceptually unfruitful and
politically unwise . It is conceptually unfruitful because
it really doesn't tell us anything about politics. The
concept of equilibrium, standing alone, is not a panacea
but an ambibuity. Whose equilibrium, in the specific
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political sense, are we to adopt? That of General Thomas
Powers? Then let us hasten to bomb Communist China. That
of Lyndon Johnson? Then let us continue (no pun intended)
to bomb North Viet-Nam. That of Y/alter Lippmann? Then
let us withdraw to coastal enclaves. That of Brezhnev and
Kosygin? Then let us withdraw from South Viet-Nam entirely.
There may be, in fact, a way in which these varying concep-
tions of equilibrium may be evaluated and chosen, but the
concept of equilibrium itself will not do the choosing
for us. "Equilibrium" standing alone is a dead end. Of
itself, it cannot solve political problems, such as the
U.S. problem in South Viet-Nam. To know that an equilibrium
is necessary is instructive, but to knov/ what type of
equilibrium is desirable, and to know precisely how, in
specific situations, to act toward the most desirable type
of equilibrium is the very essence of political action.
Any of the proposed "solutions" to the Viet-Nam problem
would bring about a new equilibrium, but what kind of
equilibrium do we v/ant? How can we best achieve it? It
is on the answer to these questions that political actions
will be predicated, and not merely on our knoY/ledge that
some sort of "equilibrium" is a necessary goal.
The empiricist fails to recognize that an
appreciation of the necessity of international equilibrium
has not solved the entire problem of world politics for
him. What is merely a useful conceptual tool - "equilibrium"
becomes the end-product of his theory. Behind the facade
which the concept of equilibrium provides, he proceeds to
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drav; the most argumentative and subjective policy con-
clusions, while passing off his world-view as "objective,"
because it is based on the "objective fact" of necessity
for equilibrium in relations among states. It is as if
a doctor suddenly realized that to remain alive, human
beings should remain healthy, then proceeded to all sorts
of bizarre and contradictory conclusions on what consti-
tutes health, and on the best way to maintain health.
The empiricist has reached a correct conclusion:
equilibrium is a precondition of international order. The
conclusion, correct as it may be, is a primitive one, and
leads directly to no policy recommendations which can claim
to be objective or productive.
Having agreed on the goal of equilibrium as a
solution to world problems, Kaplan and Morgenthau agree
also on the means by which this goal must be pursued: the
national interest. Man (Kenneth T/altz's "first image") is
a "given" in political theory; the international milieu
(the third image) is anarchic and certainly not prone to
the third -image solution (world government). For both,
then, the means for pursuit of system equilibrium is to be
found in the second image (the nation-state)
.
Morgenthau defines the primary objective of
diplomacy (the tool which must be used to preserve inter-
national peace) as "the promotion of the national interest
25
by peaceful means." In order that diplomacy may be
25Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 539.
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effective, he lists "four fundamental rules" and "five
prerequisites of compromise." In other words, for
Morgenthau, the best guarantee of equilibrium is an
enlightened pursuit of the national interest, the "light"
to be thrown by application of the rules which he - a
scholar - has laid dov/n.
Kaplan reaches almost exactly the sane conclusion
on the route to equilibrium. He dismisses those who would
regard the national interest as subjective as affirming
"that it includes values other than power," then informs
his readers that "national interests are objective and
there are as many national interests as there are national
27
needs." The objectivity of the national interest thus
asserted, Kaplan proceeds to offer his rules for the
conduct of diplomacy, in the form of an introduction to
the theory of games.
In both cases, then, the conclusion is
reached that equilibrium must be sought by pursuit
of the national interest enlightened by, in the case
of Korgenthau, application of the four rules and five
prerequisites, and in the case of Kaplan, application
of scientific game theory to political situations.
The correspondence between the two extends even deeper
than this, however. Observe the similarity of the





27Kaplan, System and Process, p. 151.
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as guiding principles for conduct of foreign policy:
. . . political realism considers a rational
foreign policy to be good foreign policy;
for only a rational foreign policy minimizes
risks and maximizes benefits and, hence,
complies with both the moral precept of
prudence gnd the political requirement of
success. z° C'orgenthau)
... A criterion of rationality in the game
is given by the minimax principle formulated
by von Neumann and llorgenstern. The minimax
criterion guarantees players a minimum game
value. 29 (Kaplan)
The similarity here is too striking to be accidental,
and indeed it is not accidental, for both Kaplan and
Morgenthau have elevated prudence to the position of
a supreme virtue for the same reason: because it fits.
The animus dominandi being the sole principle on which
human behavior, and a fortiori national behavior is based,
it follows that a policy based on minimum risk and maximum
gain is the only rational foreign policy. The minimax
criterion being the only one for which solutions are
possible in the theory of games, it follows that the only
rational course for a player to follow is one v/hich utilizes
that criterion. This is worship of the status quo epito-
mized. This is the theory of pure realism and the scien-
tific theory of politics come full circle. The social
wrongs which could issue from the pursuit of a gamesmanship
such as that ascribed to by Kaplan and Morgenthau could
someday produce an exegesis on the part of a future




Kaplan, System and Process, p. 175.
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philosopher which v/ould make Marx's criticism of bourgeois
misdeeds look tame by comparison, and a social solution,
reacting to such control and manipulation which would make
the Bolshevik revolution and its aftermath appear child's
play. Fortunately, despite what they claim for their






From the foregoing, it is evident that the attempt
at building empirical theory, in the cases of Kaplan and
Morgenthau , has been a failure. The half-truth in political
theory can be as dangerous, and ultimately unjust, as no
truth at all. This must not, however , be the end of this
thesis. "We have been engaged in a wrecking operation,"
as Stanley Hoffmann says, "Nevertheless, need for concep-
tualization and theory remains," This portion of our
thesis will examine the ultimate question of this thesis:
that of the possibility of a science of politics, in order
to determine where empirical theories fail and where, if
anywhere, they may be of use in political theory.
To say that the question of the possibility of
a science of politics is primarily a logical and epistemo-
logical one, rather than a substantive one is almost a
truism. Indeed, the failure of most empiricists to handle
this question on its own terms, which are indeed philo-
sophical rather than, strictly speaking, political, results in






questions are sophistic. "Let us not concern ourselves
with such trivia," they seem to bo saying, "and get on with
the job." The questions are left to philosophers to answer,
while the process of political model -building goes on
unaware, or at least unmindful of the fact that such a
default must result not only in mortal methodological sins,
but ultimately also in that old empiricist bugaboo,
unbalanced division of labor in building the supreme
scientific theory of politics. Floyd Hatson speaks
wisely on epistemology when he asserts that "when man is
the subject, the proper understanding of science leads
2
unmistakably to the science of understanding.""
The reason that epistemological questions have
not been engaged in the post-war development of "scientific"
political theory stems from the Enlightenment, just as the
"solutions" proposed by such theories often bear a twinge
of the simplicity which the Enlightenment postulated in
its approach to the complex political problems of the
eighteenth century. What affects both the Enlightenment
and the post-war social technocrats is the burning desire
for political reform. A "theory," or a "conceptual frame-
work" is often followed by a spate of "policy studies" in
which the theorist, with government or foundation assist-
ance, attempts to apply his theory for purposes of policy
direction.
pFloyd \i . Matson, The Broken Image: I.Ian, Science and_
Society (New York: George" BaazTllier , 19o3y, p~* 2^>5T
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The desire for political reform is not of itself
a bad thing;; to be sure, we are all tempted at one time or
another to it. What is dangerous is the potential injustice
implicit in carrying out a political theory which has not
been thoroughly thought through to its philosophical
foundation. Laissez-faire was, allegedly, a true theory,
yet it generated the excesses which spawned Marx. As the
previous chapter has pointed out , notions such as "system"
and "equilibrium" are likewise capable of excess in appli-
cation. At the very least, it would seem mandatory to ask
at the outset, and to keep asking, whether our conclusions
are really scientific B.nd
,
if so, in what sense and to what
extent. If there can be no absolute guarantee of truth in
theory of international relations it follows that there can
be no absolute guarantee of justice in the conduct of inter-
national policies.
One looks in vain through empirical works such as
Kaplan* s System and Process for an exposition of the logic
and epistemology v/hich should underlie the supposed science
of politics. The "limited time available" and the "pressing
nature of the problems that confront us" have theuselves
made these scientists believers. Kaplan's only discourse
on method, contained in the seven-page Preface to System
and Process
,
from a logical point-of-view, is simply
unsatisfactory. It is left for the polemical critics of
scientific method applied to social theory to assert that
a science of politics, or anything like it, is simply not

3D
possible. There is a debate between empiricists and other
critics, but no effective dialogue. The critics have won
the round by default.
There are some earlier works which do attack the
central question of the possibility of a science of politics,
and answer it in the affirmative. They emanate to a large
extent from the euphoria of the twenties, when the "problems"
did not seem to be so "pressing," and, one might add, when
foundations did not finance as much social research as
is the case today. One excellent example is George Catlin's
3
The Science and Method of Politics . In this book, Catlin
devotes an entire chapter to "The Possibility of a Political
Science," concluding that it is indeed a possibility, and
a highly desirable goal. A detailed look at the results
of his research should prove fruitful in determining the
logical strengths and weaknesses of "science" in "politics."
George E. G. Catlin, The Science and Method of
Politics (New York: Alfred A. KnopTf7~l327) .

40
1, THE GOAL OF A SCIENCE OF POLITICS
If a science of politics is ever to be possible,
it must start from some sort of clear appreciation of what
that science hopes to achieve in epistemoiogical terms.
Of course, a science must be applicable; that is, it must
be capable of being applied to specific sets of circum-
stances Y7ith a view to producing certain results. But
utility is most definitely not the first test of science.
The first test is validity of the grounds on which appli-
cability of science to specific situations is based. The
scientist must shov; the epistemoiogical basis on which
he makes general inferences from particular instances.
If all the flaws of the post-war development of social
theory can be ascribed to any single factor, it is precisely
the failure of empirical, particularly behavioral theorists
to appreciate this distinction. "Science," for them, means
simply "applicability." A theory is suggested -for instance:
"Military dictatorships tend to alienate the masses of
peasants in under -dove loped countries." This theory is
then indiscriminately applied to Brazil, Ecuador, Taiwan,
etc., and "verified." But is it verified? The grounds on
which the theory is applied to different situations are not
established. As a result, soma people (at least the author
of the theory) believe the hypothesis, and some do not.

/<
Surely, the result is not "science."
In order to investigate the grounds on which
scientific theories are applied, the epistemological
questions must be asked. What is "science?" What am I
looking for when I set out for "science?" In this parti-
cular respect, George Catlin's answer may be revealing:
A science, here and throughout, is
treated as a corpus of certain knowledge
,
and (as certain knowledge) valid prior to
particular experiences and despite ap-
pearance to the contrary.
The key words here are "certain" and "valid."
What types of "certitude" and "validity" is he alluding
to? If they must be absolute, then the quest for a scien-
tific politics can be completely rejected. No man can act
in the social milieu with absolute certitude that the result
he plans will in fact ensue from his action. Although
dogmatically stated hypotheses often appear as though they
are based on absolute certitude, this Y/riter seriously
doubts that empiricists, if fully questioned, would make
this claim for their theories, or postulate the necessity
of absolute certitude as a goal for science.
What Catlin is speaking of, as the remainder of
his chapter on "the possibility of a political science"
makes clear, is something less than absolute certitude.
One might call it "practical" certitude. Just what this






and to what extent, in a "scientific politics" will be
discussed shortly. It remains here to point out that it
is not "absolute certitude," and no amount of quantification
of evidence can make it absolute. The only science which
really requires absolute certitude is mathematics, and
even this may be in doubt. However, of the fact that
(using our present numbering system) two plus two equals
four, I can be absolutely certain. No additional experi-
ments are required to prove this to me, so long as the system
remains the same. "Military dictatorships" are a different
matter. Situations change; terms gain and lose relevancy;
absolute certitude here is a practical impossibility.
The fact of unattainability of mathematical
certainty in social theory is misused by both sides in the
debate over empiricism. This is an important point. On
the one hand, critics of empiricism make the claim that,
since this is the case, a science of politics is an
impossible task. This view is a stray; man. Although this
thesis will conclude that a "political science" is indeed
impossible, most critics of science have obscured the terms
of the debate by fixing their arguments around the fact of
unattainability of mathematical precision. In the realm
of physical science, there are a number of fields subordinate
to mathematics in which absolute certainty is a practical
impossibility. An excellent example is physics. Prior
to Max Planck's quantum theory it was thought that
Newtonian mechanics was capable of explaining all physical
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phenomena regarding motion. The arrival of the quantum
theory changed this view, indicating that absolute
certitude in Newton's laws had been an error. Our certi-
tude in Newton's laws was in fact practical, not absolute.
It enabled us to explain all phenomena observed at that
time. Yet no one, not even the most stalwart critic of
empiricism, could deign to pronounce that physics is not
a science. We were then practically certain that "a body
at rest or in a state of uniform motion tends to remain
at rest or in a state of uniform motion unless it is
disturbed by an unbalanced force, because it explained
all observed phenomena regarding motion. V/e should have
been "practically," rather than "absolutely" certain.
The fact that "another hypothesis might also
serve" to explain motion does not reduce this practical
certitude, unless the other hypothesis should provide a
better (i.e., more universally valid) explanation for the
phoenomena observed. This is what Max Planck did in physics
On the other hand, proponents of scientific
method as applied to social science have also misused
the argument of unattainability of mathematical precision.
In their view, such unattainability gives license for
accepting almost any hypothesis as "practically certain."
This view is equally erroneous. Although this fact hardly
requires demonstration, it is frequently overlooked by
empiricists. Take the following example:
Hypothesis I: The Cold War is the
result of Soviet aggression.
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Hypothesis II: The Cold War is the
result of Western imperialism.
Hypothesis III: The Cold War is the
result of friction ensuing from the inevitable
clash of interests between the United States
and the Soviet Union.
Which hypothesis is correct? Are any of them correct; that
is, can I be certain of any of them, or of any other
hypothesis which might "explain" the Cold War? Surely
one of them, or one which has not been set forth, is better
than the others, in that it explains more phenomena. The
third seems to be of this type , because more phenomena are
explainable with reference to it . But are all observed
Cold War phenomena explainable with reference to it? If
it is to meet the test even of practical certitude this
must be the case, just as the appearance of phenomena under
the electron microscope which are not comprehensible with
respect to Newtonian physics must lead us to reject Newton's
laws as plausible hypotheses in explanation.
The rejection of "absolute certitude" as an object
of social science, then, has led empiricists to the wrong
conclusion: that all that is necessary for "science" is to
postulate hypotheses in the abstract, in the hope that one
of them will be verified. Kaplan's work is the best, but
definitely not the only example of this methodological
bushwhacking in theory of international relations. What-
ever may be the result, it is certainly not "science."
The foregoing does not, however, deny the possi-
bility of a science of politics. The fact that results of
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research in the post-war period have been disappointing
does not make a science of politics impossible, although
by this time one might have expected empiricists to
question their faith in scientific method. Absolute
certitude is not a requirement for science, regardless
of the misuse which both sides have made of the fact of
its unattainability . Practical certitude, and by this is
meant a state of mind which assents to the fact that all
phenomena observed are explained by an hypothesis, is a
requirement for science, whether it be physical or political
It is around the question of the attainability of psractical
certitude in politics that the question of the possibility
of a science of politics must revolve.
Having disposed of the false argument of absolute
certitude as a necessary object for science, it remains
to be seen whether practical certitude is obtainable in
politics. If the object of science is truth, and if truth
in science is described as practical certitude, v/e must
investigate the question of the possibility of its attain-
ment in social science, and specifically in politics. Are
there any hypotheses extant which can explain all observed
phenomena regarding politics or an aspect of politics? If
not, are such hypotheses a possibility?
The posing of these questions themselves brings
up the first problem which social scientists must face in
their quest for a scientific politics. This problem is
the necessity for objectivity in science; objectivity which
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must be obtained even at the price of disturbing vested
interests. That objectivity is a necessity and that
vested interests will oppose objective science, even in
natural sciences, is made very clear by one of the foremost
advocates of science in politics, Daniel Lerner:
The sociology of scientific knowledge
makes enlightening history. The requirement
of a public, explicit, common fund of
propositions was established only against
heavy opposition through the centuries from
the powerful personnel of the magic and
religious industries. The struggle for a
rational science of medicine against those
skilled in charms, amulets, incantations,
herbs, and leeches is well remembered. So
is the struggle for an observational science
of astronomy against those skilled in court
astrology and clerical cosmology. 5
Nevertheless, the struggle against these vested interests
must be faced. Objectivity, which connotes truth at what-
ever cost, is a key test of science. Catlin T s argument
in favor of a scientific politics points out the necessity
for it:
Economic science by its early utterances
pleased the dominant class. Political
science in its early utterances displeased the
insurgent and victorious classes. And yet,
unless politics ventures, as Economics
ventured, to clear for itself the forest of
detail by the use of abstract hypotheses and
of a scientific method, it can no more hope
to advance to the status of a science than
chemistry could without the atomic theory.
What Catlin v/as looking for by developing a
science of politics, as what political scientists are
°Baniel Lerner, Evidence and Inference (Chicago:
Free Press of Glencoc , lOWJ", p. T.
6Catlin, op. cit., p. 95.
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looking for today, is some sort of a guarantee of justice
in politics just as Keynesian economics, at the time Catlin
wrote, was thought to contain a guarantee of economic
justice. It is hoped that by being objective; that is,
by approaching the evidence free of values (postulated
a priori ) objective "facts" may be found, that "causes"
for these "facts" may be elicited, that eventually these
"causes" will elicit "first principles" about politics, in
the form of "abstract hypotheses." Morgenthau's power
theory and Kaplan's systems theory are collections of
such abstract hypotheses. These "first principles" having
been discovered, political conduct will become a simple
matter of application of the hypothesis to the situation.
The key to this methodological approach is objectivity.
As a first step, objectivity must be applied to the evidence
at hand. The evidence at hand is contained in history.
Before the possibility of attaining objectivity
in analysis of history is discussed, a short digression
may be in order. This writer sincerely hopes that he has
not overstated the hopes of the political scientist by
a somewhat oversimplified view of the scientist's goal:
a practically certain, value -free theory of man in his
political milieu. It is admittedly true that many political
scientists have restricted their horizons somewhat in the
post-war period. Perhaps even the majority of books by
empiricists since 1945 do not contain the sweep of Politics
among Nations and System and Process. The reader will agree,
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however, that the goal of the scientist, regardless of the
content of any given book other than the two mentioned,
has not changed since Catlin stated it in Science and
Method. In a very real sense, which means in practice,
the scientist in politics hopes to be able to deduce an
"ought" from an "is," as the large number of policy studies
emanating from the empirical community amply proves. This
should be neither cause for embarrassment on the part of
empiricists, nor mirth on the part of their critics. Their
goal is indeed a laudable one. The thesis here is merely
that it is impossible of attainment because the root from
which it must spring (value -freedom) is a practical impossi-
bility and the method it uses (hypotheses supported by
empirical "evidence") does not carry the complete conviction
which practical certitude requires of science.

:..
2. THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN PROVIDING EVIDENCE
The key to objectivity in the social sciences is
objectivity in the approach which the social scientist makes
to his main body of evidence: history. In a sense, the
only evidence available to both natural and social scien-
tists is historical evidence. There can be no doubt, how-
ever, that the natural scientist has a distinct advantage
in that if he does not believe the results of an experiment
conducted in the past, he is at liberty to repeat it himself
and thus confirm or refute a hypothesis suggested by, say,
Nev/ton or Einstein.
The social scientist has no such liberty. V/hat's
past is simply past, and he must rely on the record of
history to provide him with facts so that the process of
science may begin. Moreover, the record is entirely
incomplete, and due to the unfortunate circumstance that
the great majority of historical actors and historical
recorders are dead, the record always will be incomplete.
Nonetheless, despite the fact that we will never
be sure, for instance, why Plato wrote the Republic , there
is plenty of "history" around. We may never be able, for
instance, to completely eliminate the hypothesis that Peter
Thanapopulous , of whom most of us have never heard, (he was
an Athenian garbage-collector) forgot to show up at the
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scholar's house one fateful day, and that the scholar,
forced out of his house into the garden by the stench,
began to walk around, and as he walked, he began to think ...
No tears are shed for the permanent loss of enough "facts"
to eliminate this hypothesis concerning the origin of the
Republic . It is enough for most of us to know that Plato
did indeed write it and too much for some. Most political
theorists, whether v/el Indisposed toward the empirical
approach or critical of it, would probably be prepared to
stipulate that the factual lynchpin of the proposed
"scientific politics," if it is ever to be, is likely to
be found in the portion of history that has been recorded.
The point we are making here is really a vital
one. There is an important school of philosophical thought,
headed by Karl R. Popper, which insists that recorded history
is simply the history of "international crime and mass
murder," i.e., the history of success, and that we will
never have a scientific politics because someone neglected
to fill in the tale with the history of struggles that
7failed. Most political philosophers, myself included,
would disagree. Although we might agree with Popper that
recorded history is indeed the history of success, we
would issue the rejoinder that most history in the political
field has been recorded, and that our problems stem not
7Karl R. Popper, The Open Socie ty and its Enemies





from having too few facto, but too many. Let us not weep
over the grave of Peter Thanapopolous, who wasn't even a
good garbage collector, and accept the fact that Plato did
indeed write the Republic
,
for whatever reason, and get on
with the tasks at hand.
These tasks include selection of facts which are
relevant, marshalling thorn in some sequence of cause and
effect , and inducing from this sequence a few general
hypotheses which, in their application to specific situa-
tions, will yield valid policy recommendations. The
question is, is this possible in politics?
The first task being the selection of relevant
historical "facts," we must first determine a criterion
of relevancy. Since all facts are obviously not relevant,
or since, at the very least, some facts are more relevant
than others, some standard must be used to separate and
categorize them. Different historians attach different
shades of meaning to some facts, and completely disagree
on the interpretation of others. One stalwart proponent
of a science of politics, writing like Catlin from the
innocent vantage-point of the twenties, alluded to this
problem as follows:
New knowledge must depend primarily on the
phenomena selected for correlation and ex-
planation. As soon as this is clear, it
becomes imperative to agree on what the
phenomena are. It is precisely the extent of
this agreement which accounts for the degree
of solidarity of thought in the natural
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sciences, and it is the lack of such agreement
which so largely explains the rank confusion
in the social sciences.
^
It is doubtful that an empiricist would make the same sort
of statement today. Empiricists have learned to cover their
disagreement regarding criteria of relevance by further
abstraction into such propositions as: "Systems and subsystems
in the international systems have roles and these roles have
different functions depending on v/hether they couple activity
within the subsystems of a large system or between system
9levels;" a statement which no serious student can even
understand, much less oppose. The "science of politics"
has not really advanced from the time Rueff and Catlin made
their innocent call for a criterion of relevance to the
time Kaplan published System and Process. Some political
scientists have gone their separate ways, despairing of
the hope of ever establishing a criterion of relevance for
historical "facts," and engaging in polemics against the
empiricists who have buried their disagreement on what
the criterion is to be in agreement over such euphemistically
meaningless propositions as the above. It is as if we were
all agreed that "political actions involve human beings,"
as if such agreement could produce scientific results, or
had any scientific (or political) relevance whatsoever.
°Jacques Rueff, From the Physi cal to the Socia_l
Sciences (Baltimore : The 3oEhs Hopkins Press, 1U29)
,
p. xxi .
9Kaplan, System and Process, p. 19.
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The need for a criterion of relevance in the
scientific approach to history remains. Toynbee calls
the response of the Western democracies to Mussolini's
invasion of Ethiopia, for instance, a "tale of sin and
nemesis," basing his judgment on the "facts" of the exist-
ence of a collective security system, of the blatantly
unjustified aggression of Italy, of the timid, spineless
and opportunistic behavior of British and French political
leaders. Another earnest student (myself) calls the
response "realistic" and "quite praiseworthy," basing his
judgment on the facts of the European desire for peace at
any price, the poor condition of the British Fleet, and
the ambiguous position of the United States. Unless
"sinful" conduct is "praisev/orthy" there is a disagreement
here on which facts are relevant. Whence does this disagree
ment stem, and is it insuperable?
Rueff was quite correct, albeit futile, in his
call for agreement among political scientists on the
selection of phenomena which are to be classified. Such
agreement is a precondition of "science," properly under-
stood. Withdrawal into "abstract formalism" by the use
of such concepts as "system" does not eliminate disagree-
ment, but plasters it over. "System," as the previous
chapter has pointed out, is an ambivalent concept. It has
10Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs
,





both wide and narrow connotations. If it is used in the
narrow sense, its use will produce disagreement among
political scientists regarding its relevance; used in the
wide sense it merely covers disagreement, is analytically
unfruitful and ultimately meaningless.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that Rueff's call
for a criterion of relevance has gone largely unanswered
among empiricists in the post-war period; despite the fact
that such a criterion or criteria have not been agreed
upon, the burden of proof is upon this writer to prove
that the construction of such a criterion is an impossible
task.
In effect, the search for a criterion of relevance
is the search for similarities among historical phenomena.
Raymond Aron has aptly phrased this in his statement that
,
indeed, "historical understanding consists of perceiving
differences among similar phenomena and similarities
among different ones." It is almost pedestrian to point
out, as so many critics of empiricism have, that no two
historical situations are ever exactly the same. The fact
remains that similarities do indeed exist, and political
theory, to say nothing of political science, would be
impossible without reference to these similarities. The
Graeco-Bulgarian war was a war. Y/orld War II was also a
Raymond Aron, "Evidence and Inference in History,"
Lerner, op. cit., p. 27.
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war. In this, at least, we can say that two events are
similar. Without the conceptual tool "war," and without
a number of conceptual tools like "war," political theory
would be impossible. The political theorist finds in his
history book a situation in which people under one flag
were shooting at people under another flag, and calls it
a "war." Whether that theorist is Thomas Hobbes or Morton
Kaplan, nobody argues with him.
The disagreement begins when the political
scientist begins to delve deeper into history in search
of more similarities, so that his criterion of relevance
may be established. One might say that the empiricist
finds similarities too easily - that he is not critical
enough to find differences where they are present, whereas
the critics of empiricism are quick to note dissimilarities
in historical "facts," and very skeptical of attempts to
stretch "sameness" for purpose of analysis. In effect,
the empiricist "finds" similarities beca.use he wants to
find them. The critic passes over similarities because
he is not alert for them, and doesn't particularly care
whether he finds them or not. Everyone agrees that there
are both similarities and differences in history; the
disagreement arises when the attempt is made to separate
them.
In the foregoing I have purposefully overlooked
one element of the "similarity-difference" debacle; namely,
that politicians and sometimes even political theorists
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frequently have a policy-axe to grind v/hen they "find"
historical precedents which are "made" to relate to
contemporary world politics. We hear, for instance, how
much the present position of the United States resembles
that of Great Britain prior to Munich, with the obvious
policy recommendation that appeasement be discarded as
an alternative. Critics of U. S. foreign policy rejoin
with "differences" between our present situation and the
thirties, with the equally obvious recommendation that
appeasement or at least "accommodation" not be rejected
as an alternative. The reasons for this disagreement are
not theoretical and academic, but practical. They are
vital, however, in that they reveal a very important
element in our argument: that political scientists must
approach historical facts with some sort of stance - some
perhaps incomplete theory, v/hich they count on history to
fill in. It is the necessity for this stance which makes
final agreement on criteria of relevance an impossible
task.
The world wars have made political scientists
very skeptical of the notion that history is a neat arrange-
ment of facts, with categories constructed in such a way
that prejudice in approaching history is eliminated.
E. II. Can* cites Lord Acton as having said in 189S that
"we can dispose of conventional history. ... now that




capable of solution." Almost a century of relative
stability in international relations had lulled political
theorists into seeing history as a flat field of facts,
the "science of history" as a not-too-distant goal. As
stability in international politics has become more and
more rare, different philosophies of history have progres-
sively diluted Acton's optimism, until we find Sir George
Clark telling us in 1957 that "there is no objective
13historical truth."
Y/e may find Clark's pessimism a little extreme
,
but there is an element of necessary realism in it. We
may set out, as Popper indeed sets out, to prove that
"history" is merely the "history of international crime
14
and mass murder," or as Marx did to prove that "history"
] 5is the "history of class struggles. " The important point
is that these judgments, true or false - or half -true -
as they may be, did not result from dispassionate, Acton-
like research of a flat landscape of historical facts.
Both Popper and Marx found in history generally what they
set out to find. "Facts" were selected - as indeed they
must be selected - on the basis of the stance which Marx
12E. H. Carr, What is History? (London: MacMillan
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and Popper assumed toward the body of recorded history.
If an appreciation of this does not make us subjectivists
v/ith Sir George Clark, it should lead us at least to a
diminution of our layman* s faith in the Acton theory of
history. Empiricists, however, have not lost their faith
in Acton's science, which plays for them the same role
which faith in 1a i ssez-f aire played for the political
philosophers of the Enlightenment. Some "imponderables"
must be overlooked - for the sake of science! The tail
(science) begins to wag the dog (political theory)
.
The reason that different "stances" are taken
toward the body of recorded history is that different
histories are written by different people in different
places and at different times. It is virtually inconceivable
that Popper, for instance, could have seriously advanced -
or for that natter even thought of - his "criminal" theory
of history in 189S . It would have been contrary to almost
all "facts" of nineteenth century world politics. Y/ar was
not a crime, but "a continuation of diplomacy by other
means," used to maintain stability in the European balance-
of -power. If he had suggested his hypothesis in Victorian
England he would have been an object of scorn and derision.
It was World War I which made his theory relevant - if not
quite tenable.
The "flat field of facts" simply does not exist.
It takes a historian to breathe into the record of history
and give it life, and as long as the world changes, there




The empiricist fails to see the contingency of
historical interpretation for what it is. Facts, for him,
arc facts. They are not to be re-interpreted, re-discussed
,
and re -lived in each generation, but to be fed into a
machine which will decide on an interpretation which is
timeless. But the very timelessness of the interpretation
makes the science of politics static. Assume for a mement
that the "science of politics" had gone into effect in the
sixteenth century - around the time, for instance, of the
Council of Trent. That Council was bound to have a vast
effect on European social, political and religious life.
The "machine" envisioned by the science of politics would
be programmed in such a way that church councils v/ould be
given great weight in political affairs. What v/ould this
timeless machine tell us today of the probable effects
of Vatican II? One can easily see that most of its predic-
tions v/ould be wrong, and almost all v/ould be irrelevant.
The "science of politics" when confronted with
the need for criteria of relevance in interpreting histori-
cal facts, then, can take one of two courses. It can with-
draw into euphemisms, covering real disagreement and
accomplishing nothing, or it can retreat into "timelessness,
which glorifies the status quo. Both characteristics are
present in modern political empiricism. Neither is useful,
or politically relevant. "Objectivity," in the sense
understood by modern empiricism, is simply not possible.
Criteria of relevance on which we can have final agreement
for the proposed science of politics do not exist, nor will
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they ever be found. Historical "fact" is a relative concept
If the above arguments are applicable to the quest
for objectivity in approaching historical facts, they are
even more applicable to the search for historical causes.
Since it is impossible to pronounce final judgment on the
interpretation of any given historical fact, it is at least
equally impossible to do the same for the political actions
which generate historical facts. It is not the intent of
this writer to engage in the "free will~determinisra"
debate v/hich has so long plagued the social sciences. We
are perfectly willing to admit that any historical fact
can be thought of as having had a determinate causal
sequence v/hich produced one result and could not have
produced any other. The point is that this debate is
an irrelevant one, for purposes of historical analysis,
because the determinate sequence cannot, finally and
objectively, be worked out.
Raymond Aron, in his essay on "evidence and
inference in history" uses the immediate origins of the
First World War as an example to prove the point under
consideration. Probably no historical events except
those surrounding the life of Christ have ever been so
thoroughly culled over with a view to determining causes
as those which occurred between Sarajevo and the German
invasion of Belgium. Agreement is far from complete.
1GAron, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
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Determining causes is fixing responsibility, and emotions
become involved. The passage of time , and with it emotional
involvement, may ease the quest for "causes" somewhat, but
will never finally resolve it. V/e know the causal sequence
is there; we may even know that it is historically deter-
minate. What we don't know, v/ith "scientific" assurance,
is what it is.
The empiricist balks at such a revelation.
Science must be "objective," and we seem to be suggesting
the glorification of subjectivism. To be sure, subjectivism
in the extreme carries with it the weight of a mighty
injustice, and the danger of totalitarianism . But so,
in the extreme stasis which ensues from objectivism, does
its counterpart. The point is that an important - one might
even say a crucial - element of political theory is to some
extent "subjective," and that far from denying it, v/e
should recognize it and work v/ith it. The raw material
of political science is man in his political milieu. No
matter how the political scientist tries, he cannot free
himself from his own humanity to view man with the objec-
tivity that science requires. Nor should he try. The
humanity of the social scientist is not a shackle to be
broken but a gift to be utilized. We must agree v/ith
Louis Wirth, who tells us in the Preface to Karl Mannheim's
most famous work that "insight may be regarded as the core
cf social knowledge," and that it is "participation in




meaning, and intelligibility as well as bias." The
shackles which church and state placed on scientific
knowledge in x>revious centuries have been broken. It
is time to take the emphasis off "objectivity" and place
it on the wrongs which can ensue from a dogmatic objec-
tivity run wild. Catlin tells us that knowledge resulting
from the use of scientific method "may give us, as every
practical science should, increased control
,
the control
of men over the hitherto alarmingly uncontrollable behavior
of men." Are we to replace the shackles of church and
autocratic state with the shackles of the technocrats?
This is a question which our generation has not asked,
but it must be asked and answered if political theory is
to remain free of arbitrary strictures and ensuing injustice
17Louis Wirth, "Preface," Karl Mannheim, Ideology and
Utopia (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner &~~Co .
,
LtdT7~
T03TOT, P • xxii
.
18Catlin, op. cit., p. 107.
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3. THE FUNCTION OF HYPOTHESES IN THEORY-BUILDING
A look at "historical fact" and "historical
cause" has shown the impossibility of attaining the
value -freedom which is a prerequisite for the science of
politics. There is yet another reason for the impossi-
bility of that science, however, and one which is dealt
with at less length by political theorists, but is no
less damaging. It concerns the method which the science
of politics must use.
Any science uses a combination of inductive and
deductive logic to arrive at conclusions. That is, a
scientist observes a phenomenon, repeats it experimentally
in his laboratory, if possible, and comes eventually to
a general conclusion about it which leads him to believe
that further repetition of the experiment is unnecessary.
From the evidence, then, he "induces" a general statement
concerning the phenomena. The actual inductive "step" is
generally taken by advancing a tentative hypothesis which
explains the phenomenon satisfactorily. From the general
statement, the scientist is able to "deduce" further
explanatory statements. The processes of "induction" and
"deduction" are closely parallel to "generalization" and
"prediction." The foregoing discussion of history has

G:
demonstrated the extreme tenuousness of the grounds on
which the first step of science - generalization - is
based. If the generalization must be tentative, continually
subject to further refinement, even, possibly, completely
in error or in danger of becoming irrelevant, the pre-
dictions which are based on it must carry the same lack of
conviction. Therefore, the political scientist is well
advised to keep his hypotheses limited and to advance them
with great care. The wider the generalization in political
science, the greater the danger of error.
The danger results from an "inductive leap"
which must be taken when a limited amount of evidence has
given the political scientist "enough" conviction to
formulate a general hypothesis. The evidence of history
is never complete , whereas the need for hypotheses in
order to "build" inductive theory remains. The flaw of
the empiricist here is that he is not critical enough of
his evidence; the result is a general hypothesis which
does not convince - does not really carry the "practical
certitude" spoken of earlier.
The reason complete conviction is not achieved
is that there is a real and distinct - not merely logical -
possibility that, as Aquinas told us, "another hypothesis
might also serve."
It should be noted that Aquinas was not the
last logician to advance the above argument. Raymond
Aron has said essentially the same about the use of
hypotheses in social science:
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An hypothesis is confirmed by the events
it enables us to predTct". ftTVould be
dangerous to say that it has been verified
,
because an hypothesis - a certain system of
thought or a certain psychological mechanism -
is not the only one on the basis of which
inferences can be made. 19
In making this statement, Aron was following not
only Aquinas, but the eminent and respected logician
Morris R. Cohen, who says, in speaking of the acceleration
hypothesis:
Nevertheless, the evidence for the ac-
celeration hypothesis remains only probable.
The hypothesis is only probable on the evidence
because it is always logically possible to
find some other hypothesis from which all the
verified propositions are consequences.
If this is true even of physics, how much more true is it
of political science, where the possibility of "another
hypothesis'* is far greater!
This writer can find only one empiricist who
has handled this logical argument against the science of
politics on its own ground. It is, strangely enough,
Morton Kaplan, who wrote in 1952:
Cohen points cut that "verification" has
become a fetish that has been substituted for
critical examination. He believed that an
insufficient distinction had been made between
"verification" and "confirmation." Any hypothesis
that explains things is to a certain extent
confirmed. If one believes that thunder occurs
because Zeus shook his rod, every clap of thunder
confirms the hypothesis. But, Cohen holds, such
confirmation is not verification, for it does not
19Aron, op. cit .
,
p. 28.
20Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduc tion
to Logic and Scie ntific Method (New York": Harcourt,
Brace & CoT7 T9"3U ) , p . 2U1T
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exclude the possibility that some other
hypothesis may explain the phenomena as well
or better. It seems doubtful to the author
tha t even a posTtTvTst wourd~adTance" suc'h~~an
argument
,
Tor it is, Tn"~eTTec t , t he~f aTTacy~"o
f




Kaplan's reply is, of course, completely specious and
unsatisfactory. Arguing from the possibility of a
contrary hypothesis to the lack of complete conviction of
a suggested hypothesis is definitely not arguing from
consequent to antecedent. If I hold a paper bag which I
have been told contains ten pieces of fruit and the first
nine turn out to be oranges, I may hypothesize that I held
a bag containing oranges© My hypothesis may indeed be
wrong. The tenth may turn out to be an apple. Is Kaplan
to label me a positivist for pointing this out to him?
Far be it from this writer to shake Kaplan's faith in Zeus;
suffice it only to say that his reply to Cohen is unsatis-
factory.
As a matter of fact, Kaplan implicitly accepts
Cohen's objection to the science of politics by turning
to another technique: Stringing together "probable"
hypotheses so that the evidence in favor of the general
theory will be overwhelming. However, this too is logically
unsatisfactory. It amounts to the same procedure as trying
to create a surplus by stringing together a group of
deficits. Kaplan is thinking about the multiplication of
21
Morton A. Kaplan, Some Elements of thje Legal
and of the Political Philosophy of Morns Cohen
TA"nn~Arb~5F
:





conviction which results from connecting hypotheses which
are, say, 95% probable. This writer is concerned rather
with the multiplication of error which results from
connecting hypotheses which are 5% wrong.
At this point, the argument passes from one of
logic to one of mathematics, in which this writer is not
adequately schooled to speak v/ith assurance. The use of
"probable" hypotheses in series has been critized at length,
however, by Morris Cohen. He tells us that:
The relatively small number of observations
that we generally have to deal with in the social
sciences makes the application of probability
curve a source of grave errors. For all the
mathematical theories of probability refer only
to infinite series (for which we substitute as
a practical equivalent "the long run") . V.'here
the number is small there is no assurance that
we have eliminated the fallacy of selection.
The mathematical error of applying a continuous
curve to a discrete number of observations
produces ludicrous results.
The point is that no amount of manipulation and multipli-
cation will make a wrong hypothesis right, or an irrelevant
hypothesis relevant.
It has been stated previously that practical
certitude is a requirement for science. The logical point
that "another hypothesis may also serve" should not be
construed as indicating that, because of this fact,
practical certitude is impossible in politics. The point
is that there is a quantitative difference in the assurance
22Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature (Glencoe, 111.:




witb which a hypothesis may be "verified" in a science
such as physics, and that with which one may be verified
in politics. The fact that "another hypothesis might
also serve" need not normally be an item of concern to the
physicist, but should always be of concern to the political
scientist. Is the effective control of the rural population
in South Viet -Nam by the Viet Cong, for instance, the result
of Vietnamese nationalism, or the clever use of terror
tactics by communists, or the desire of the peasants for
peace regardless of who controls the villages? These three
views are hypotheses, and are to some extent mutually
exclusive. Premature closure around any one of them will
result in such a situation that "facts" which verify will
be admitted, and "facts" which do not verify will be cast
aside as "irrelevant."
If this is true of "middle -range conceptualizing,"
it is even more true of theories which take a world view,
such as Morgenthau's power theory or Kaplan's systems
theory. The animus dominandi and the "systems concept"
do indeed explain some phenomena; those phenomena which
are not explained by them are declared irrelevant. For
Morgenthau politics is defined, in effect, as an activity
in which power is exchanged. Other aspects of political
relations are considered irrelevant. It "naturally"
follows that all politics is pov/er politics. For Kaplan,
"system" is defined in terms of "desirable behavioral
regularities"; all irregularities, or regularities which
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are not "behavioral" or "describable" are irrelevant.
But if all observed phenomena with respect to a given
object, be it control of the South Vietnamese rural
population or "world politics" are not explained by a
hypothesis, practical certitude, and with it the science
of politics, are impossible. The tentativeness of
historical interpretation must cause us to reject hopes
that any "world view" hypothesis will ever be adequate
to explain all political phenomena; the limited relevance
and scope of middle -range concepts such as, say,
"nationalism" to explain all phenomena about, the nation-





A deep look into the contingency of historical
interpretation and the frailty of scientific method
should be, one would think, a chastening experience.
Surprisingly, for most empiricists , this has not been
the case. Instead of less science, they tell vis, more
science is needed, as if multiplication of data v/ould
both force objectivity on us and make scientific
method more workable.
To be sure, emphasis on objectivity in
social science is praiseworthy . Empiricists are
intellectual inheritors of the Enlightenment tradition
in their skepticism of arbitrary selection of values
which must be imposed on a docile and unwilling commu-
nity. But it is the thesis here that the reaction of
empiricism to arbitrary selection and imposition is an
over-reaction; that their quest for real objectivity in
both conclusions and method is an impossible one, and
that their approach can result only in either euphemistic
theories which rapidly lose their relevance in our
dynamic v/orld, or in theories which in their extreme
freeze the status quo, with inevitable injustice in
their application. The over-reaction to subjectivism
in political theory leads to another subjectivism, the
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more reprehensible because its values are not the stated
values of "monarchy" or "aristocracy" or even "democracy"
but the submerged values of the scientist. Values there
will be in political theory as long as man is a political
being, it well behooves us to get them out in the- open
where they can be critically examined and chosen. "We
evaluate as we breathe," says Stanley Hoffmann. If
this is true, values must be put back into political
theory, and method made to correspond to them, not the
reverse.
It is the misapplication of scientific method
which has led the social scientist to believe that he
can deduce an "ought" from an "is." But the empiricist
sees only one side of the coin when he sees man as con-
tingent, determinate, and a political means. Scientific
method can tell us nothing of man as a creator of history,
as a free agent with political ends. To see man in this
latter aspect, and to be able to relate the two sides of
political man, a more creative method is needed - one
which possesses a characteristic which scientific method
knows too little of - insight. If the method of insight
is subjective, at least it is admittedly subjective and,
as will be shown shortly, it can be braked from excesses
by the use of scientific method. The important point is
that the methodological tail must not wag the political
dog.
-"-Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 188.
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Important beginnings have been made along these
lines, showing at least that the art of political theory
is not dead. No one would label such theorists as
Niebuhr and Aron "scientists," yet there can be no doubt
that they say a great deal about politics - a great
deal more effectively than any "empiricists." This is
because they speak of values in politics and are not
afraid of being labelled "subjective." Both have extracted
from realism one necessary element of political theory:
an appreciation of the extent to which the achievement
of a lasting harmony of competing interests is not
possible. And both have rejected the conclusion which
pure realism drav/s from this appreciation: that because of
the impossibility of such an easy harmony, the solution to
political theory is a facile identification of the national
interest and the interests of mankind.
Practical certitude we can never have in political
affairs, but political man must act. This is the paradox
which the statesman must face, and the dilemma which
must be investigated by political theory. It is in the
gap between the practical requirement to act, which arises
out of a situation, and the moral requirement to act
wisely (that includes, with complete information) which
arises out of man's status as a moral being, that politics
really takes place. A consideration of this gap must
take human values into account.
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The danger which political theory faces in its
consideration of values is that of arriving at lowest-
common-denominators, just as pov/er theory and systems
theory are lowest -common-denominators. F.S.C. Northrop
falls into this trap by attaching similar weight to all
world cultures. The implication is that if we add up
all the values of the different cultures of the world
and divide by the number of cultures, we will somehow
2
arrive at true values. Surely this method is erroneous.
But Northrop has at least made a start. He has started to
arbitrate the dispute between empiricism and its polemical
critics, and he recognizes the paradox of politics.
Despite the fact that the "science of politics"
is an impossible task, there is still a role for science
and empiricism in modern political theory. The excesses
of empiricism can and must be avoided, but this does not
mean that science and scientific method must be completely
cast out
.
Stanley Hoffmann suggests three uses for science
in modern theory. "Empirical science helps us," he says,
"not to decide what we should want, but to see how we could
get what we want, what would be the implications of what
3
we v/ant , and even what we should not want .
"
F.S.C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the
Hu?iianities (New York: lUericTian "Bool^.sT' Inc., i9"5"977~~pp. 295-9
^Hoffmann, op. cit. p. 187.
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With regard to the first role of science: the
neat division whereby the philosopher tells the scientist
what he wants and the scientist advises on how to get it
is a dangerous one, for two reasons. First, it accentuates
the division which has already occurred between philosophers
and political scientists. Second, the distinction between
ends and means is nowhere near as clear-cut as a "philos-
opher-what, scientist-how" division of labor would tend
to indicate. In conceptualization about international
politics, as in the actual conduct of foreign policy,
ends and means are woven together to such a degree as to
render a division virtually impossible.
With regard to the other two roles for science
suggested by Hoffmann, that of advising the political
theorist of the implications of a suggested value, and
particularly of warning the theorist of possible adverse
effects which may issue from a proposed line of action,
there is indeed a place for the scientist. We might
learn through use of scientific method, for instance,
th?t political stability is a precondition for disarma-
ment, or that good political relations among states,
conditions permitting, generally follow good economic
relations. The caveat which must be entered, however,
is that such advice is of a transitory nature, and that
the interlacing of "scientific" propositions to form a
complete theory inevitably results in a closed system
incapable of dealing dynamically with a dynamic world.
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One immediate advantage of these roles suggested
for empiricism is that it places political "science"
where it belongs: back in the Enlightenment saddle of
criticism, rather than in the self-defeating position
of trying to build affirmative political theory. The
terms of the debate in theory of international relations
have been obscured by the fact that the critical spirit has
indeed been too subjective. If empiricism will accept its
reduced tasks, it will act as an effective brake on devel-
opment of overly subjective or over-idealistic theory.
Empiricism can act more effectively, as Cohen
says, in the role of "negating" values set up by ab-
solutistic and unhistorical systems than of suggesting
them. The great advantage of scientific method is that
it enable us to rule out hypotheses. If, for example,
hypotheses A, B, and C are all possible, and B can be
ruled out by the empiricist - even tentatively - political
theory will be so much the better.
This, then, is the role of the scientist: to
work with the philosopher instead of against him, to cast
out reliance on a scientific method which is largely in-
applicable to social theory, and cease hiding highly
questionable philosophic theorems in "scientific"
language. It is time for empiricists to turn away from
the problems induced by their own systems and to work
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